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Abstract
Peer-to-peer networks, without central servers, have peers operating both as client and server. This paper discusses ﬂaws of P2P
networks and clouds. That P2PClouds can be derived from idle resources is also brieﬂy discussed. A re-classiﬁcation of P2P attacks
has been proposed based on attacker goals. Threat modeling enables developing designs for secure systems. An existing goal based
threat modeling approach has been used and threats and countermeasures of a P2PCloud has been modeled using Threat-SIG.
Finally, security requirements of P2PClouds are discussed as being potential area for further research in this ﬁeld.
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1. Introduction
Peer-to peer (P2P) computing or P2P networks essentially involves a cluster of nodes connected in a network.
Users at each node use the network to accomplish a task, download ﬁles, transfer data, search for information and
so on. It is a form of distributed computing paradigm, where any user sitting at one node is able to utilize other
nodes and their resources1 namely: disk space, computation speed, and bandwidth. Data sought by node A may be
present/absent/partly present in its peer node B. On querying, B may ﬁnd the complete data or a part of it with a peer
of B (say C or D). Likewise, information sought by one node may be found with its peer or with the peer of its peer.
This essentially indicates that a peer can perform as a client as well as a server of information. The effect of being
able to procure resources from or provide resources to peers in a network, share one’s own storage space with others
introduce security issues in peer groups or peer networks. This also holds true for quasi-closed groups in which a subset
of the original set of nodes form a peer network, while superset nodes enter and leave as required. P2P networks such
as Napster and Gnutella are also referred to as P2P Overlays2. Overlays can be considered as a set of servers across
networks that provide infrastructure for different applications, forward data and can be operated by third parties3.
P2P networks have since found their way into being used4 as trusted network in critical infrastructure providing
organizations. P2P networking has unresolved design ﬂaws due to which it has persistently remained a target to certain
attack trends. This directly points to the requirement to ensure that nodes agree to security protocols of a peer group
and function to meet goals of the group. Some of the major ﬂaws in P2P networking are:
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• Absence of trust-based inter-peer communication: Peers join and leave the group as per their requirements and IP
addresses could be dynamic or even spoofed. This implies that decoy or rogue nodes may assume identities and
join peer groups.
• Absence of policing for secure operations: In the absence of central control, there is little or no policing to
establish trust within a peer group or for managing untrusted code5 in a peer network.
• Peer reputation does not consider security aspects: There is no criterion based on which an unknown peer
maybe introduced to a peer group. Decentralized methods of computing peers’ reputation based on trafﬁc, search
efﬁciency6 and other methods have been proposed so far. Peer reputation in applications such as Torrent is usually
computed based on their contribution in the peer network, search hits and misses.
• Lack of monitoring of performance: Peers are not resilient to botnets (networks of infected computers controlled
by an attacker) or as the current trends are, to super botnets. Super botnets are advantageous compared to a large
botnet in that, they involve a mass of botnets and propagate very fast. Bot tracking procedures need to improve to
keep up with maturing botnet technologies7.
Cloud computing provides the beneﬁt of making ICT services available as a commodity. This ensures that the
organizationswhich use cloud services can respond faster and reliably to their customer’s needs and improve their own
efﬁciency8. Cloud computing paradigm provides on-demand self-service of essential components that are required by
all ICT dependent sectors, namely: software, platform comprising of programming languages, libraries, services, and
tools required and infrastructure components such as, computing resources, storage and selected network components.
The availability of such resource pool through different business models as public, private, community and hybrid
clouds is a security concern. With public, community and hybrid cloud there is practically no control over the security
of such resource9. With clouds a number of security loopholes are introduced, such as:
• Ambiguity of responsibility for the cloud service providers and users.
• Loss of conﬁdentiality, integrity, availability or even authenticity due to reduced accountability involved with
cloud usage.
• Loss of governance due to non-uniformity in application of internal controls, regarding which controls are
selected and how they are integrated across different deployment models (SaaS, PaaS and IaaS or NaaS).
• Users do not have a true view of the security level provided by the service provider as the cloud is merely a black
box. Users have no idea as to where from their services are provided and how secure are those services10.
• Cloud services are accessed via unprotected, easily breached APIs.
• Clouds have little or no provision for providing privacy to user data and often do not meet compliance
requirements for data protection.
• Clouds are being used to provide services such as in Microsoft Azure, or Amazon EC2.
Considering the features, merits and demerits of both cloud and peer-to-peer networking, research efforts have been
directed towards incorporating Clouds and P2P network into one single realizable system of P2P Clouds. A P2P Cloud
would in effect provide on-demand scalability, computing resource and storage space (which can be added) as per
varying needs. There would be no central point of failure, or central management and resource addition can be done by
installing daemons. Also, such P2P Cloud System or P2PCS has been realized as a fully decentralized distributed IaaS
cloud infrastructure11 from idle resources existing in an organization. The P2PCS has been derived by using daemons
and algorithms as follows:
• Peers comprise of a large number of networked nodes owned by different organizations/individuals of differing
capacity & computing power (nodes ranging from notebooks to multicore servers).
• Resource sharing is done by installation of daemon.
• Daemon provides 2 interfaces: one for entering user requests, another for communicating with other peers.
• Daemon handles churn ‘gracefully’ and maintains cohesion among nodes. Thus, the cloud as a whole is not
reliable as nodes may enter and leave the cloud as per their requirements. Algorithms and protocols are used for
handling churn and maintaining internode cohesion
• Other algorithms are required for slicing/partitioning resources among service requestors and creation of
sub-clouds. Slices are dynamic since user resource requirements may shrink or expand over time.
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• Nodes inside slices may run reliably or crash. Keeping such possibilities in mind, nodes within a slice can interact
with nodes inside as well as in the global cloud.
P2PCS as discussed above is a constantly changing repository of resources, the changing nature being due to the
entering and leaving of nodes. The stability of such a structure is maintained mainly by using gossip protocols. The
most important requirement towards maintaining the stability of the structure is management of its partitions or slices.
Bringing together peers and clouds even strengthens the security concerns of such structure including the feasibility
of monitoring security in a peer cloud and validity of the results of monitoring.
However, the P2PCS model does not have any provision for trust and security-based reputation management in
its existing framework. Methods for providing access control, security monitoring using OpenFlow and Software
Deﬁned Networking (SDN) approaches already exist12. P2P Cloud systems are used for providing Content Delivery
Network (CDN) or in Data Centres. Some examples of Cloud service providers in use are: My Cloud (provides
comprehensive multi-cloud security platform), Amazon Cloud Front (CDN) and SymForm (providing distributed
backup), Peer-to-Peer backup (for P2P cloud storage).
With peers interacting with other peers or peer groups, peer groups talking to each other and lack of proper internal
controls in clouds used by the P2P networks, this can have far-reaching effects. P2P Clouds due to weaknesses inherent
in P2P networks and Clouds, provide scope for further research.
The goal of the paper is to perform threat modelling on P2P Cloud system and identify threats and vulnerabilities
associated with the system and arrive at possible mitigation measures. This in turn would also aid in identifying
security requirements of a P2P Cloud system
The main contributions of this paper are: (i) the proposed re-classiﬁcation of attacks on P2P networks on the basis
of the objective of the attacker and (ii) the goal based threat modelling of P2P Cloud. Using the goal based threat
modelling one can analytically arrive at the threat-vulnerability pairs and their respective mitigation measures. The
ﬁnal outcome of this work is the identiﬁcation of the mitigation measures as operational softgoals by analysis of the
threat-vulnerability pairs. The paper also identiﬁes the security requirements related to P2P Cloud as being the open
research areas to be considered for future work.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses a goal based classiﬁcation scheme of security attacks (on
P2P networks) as proposed by the authors. Section 3 provides a discussion on Goal oriented Threat modeling while
Section 4 provides details on the threat modeling method (discussed in the earlier section) applied on a P2PCloud
system. Section 5 concludes listing some of the areas related to P2PCloud security having research potential.
2. Security Attacks in P2P Network
P2P networking as a relatively new paradigm of networking and resource sharing is not resilient against attacks.
The fact that peer networking can enable resource sharing on a massive scale and involve idle nodes often outside of
an established network is motivation enough for large scale attacks.
In this paper the authors propose a re-classiﬁcation of the attacks based on the objectives of the attackers. To the
best of our knowledge, such classiﬁcation has not been done yet. An existing classiﬁcation scheme39 classiﬁes attacks
based on the relatively independent processes like identity assignment, routing and application which are present in
P2P networks. Based the objectives of the attackers the attacks have been grouped as follows:
2.1 Attacks to acquire nodes
The importance of this type of attack is due to the fact that, capturing nodes is a way of acquiring more processing
capability apart from being a good start for launching massive network perimeter breach attacks. Attacks such as
Eclipse and Sybil can be launched after acquiring new nodes. Eclipse attacks typically involve a group of malicious
node posing as prospective peers to a victim node say X. Node X then makes the malicious nodes as its peers. The
effect here is to hijack the node, block out any actually non-malicious node from communicating with X, as well as
to completely gain control over the trafﬁc send and received by X, essentially making a censorship attack14. A Sybil
attack is related to an eclipse attack. In Sybil, a malicious node assumes a large number of identities and becomes
peers to a victim node15.
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Table 1. Objective-Based Classiﬁcation of Attacks on P2P Networks.
Node acquisition Service Disruption Disintegrating network structure
Eclipse, Botnet architecture based measures22. Routing attacks, Secure Routing19. Churn, Dynamic hypercube & pancake
topology based systems26.
Eclipse, proximity neighbor selection23. Identity based attacks, proof managers27.
Eclipse, enforce degree bounds on nodes14.
Sybil, Trusted certiﬁcation15 .
Sybil, Constrained Routing Tables19.
Sybil, Recurring fee24.
Bot attacks, Centralised defense mechanism25.
In both these types of attacks the victim is isolated from other possible non-malicious peers and these attacks enable
acquiring unsuspecting vulnerable nodes which can possibly be used (later) to work as Command-and–Control (C&C)
centers of botnets.
Botnets or bot attacks are rising signiﬁcantly. A bot is a node over which a malicious node gets control. Several of
such nodes form a botnet or an army of bots with differing topology. There is a command and control (C&C) center
for every botnet. A botnet is run by a botmaster who sends commands to the C&C center16,17. These commands are
transmitted to the bots via communicationwith the C&C center. This allows an attacker to enjoy anonymity, perpetuate
attacks through any number of bot nodes and even leave or acquire bots as per attack strategies. Botnets can be widely
scattered (physically) and can resort to fast ﬂuxing18 by which locating a botnet becomes difﬁcult. In fast-ﬂuxing, a
domain name is mapped to a number of IP addresses (hundreds, or even thousands) rather than a single IP address.
2.2 Attacks to disrupt services
Routing attacks come in this category. Such attacks are in the form of incorrect routing updates, incorrect lookup
update and so on. The objective could be disrupting normal routing services of nodes or, changing its routes to gather
information or send information19.
2.3 Attacks to disintegrate existing network structure
Random leaving and joining a network by a number of peers can disturb a network structure in that, the load
distribution balance will be lost. In severe cases the peer network may break down. Churn is a type of network level
attack in which peers join and leave network as per their requirements, thereby dividing the original peer network into
smaller sub-networks and the structure of the peer network breaks down20,21.
The Table 1 lists the attacks under the heads into which they are classiﬁed. Information under each attack class
include: Attack Name and Suggested Solution.
3. Goal Oriented Threat Modeling
Considering the classiﬁcation of attacks based on the objective of the attacker that has been presented earlier in
this paper, a goal-based threat modeling approach has been considered in this paper. Goal based threat modeling can
either model the goal of the adversary and how such goals are achieved as in attack tree based modeling28 or how a
system goal is hampered by events as in the goal based approach which extends upon the NFR model and uses negative
softgoals29. The NFR model focuses on the Non-FunctionalRequirements of a software system, which are essentially
the quality attributes of which security, reliability are some. It introduces the concept of considering the non-functional
requirements as the softgoals or those goals which “need to be addressed not absolutely but in a good enough sense”.
The “good enough” achievement of the softgoals is in keeping with the difﬁculty level associated with the problem
and its corresponding solution. NFR model has the concept of satisﬁcing (instead of satisfying) the softgoals as such
softgoals can be addressed in a “good enough” sense only. The softgoals may satisﬁce or deny (negatively satisﬁce)
another softgoal30. In this type of threat modeling, each non-functional requirement being represented as a softgoal
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undergoes an iterative interleaving process whereby they are satisﬁced (positively or negatively) by using and/or
decompositions, other operations and arguments29. Such semantics result in the formation of Softgoal Interdependency
Graph (SIG) as an outcome of the NFR model.
Oladimeji modiﬁes the NFR model in that negative softgoals (goals of an attacker) are introduced30 for representing
threats and their inverse contributions for evaluating design alternatives during analysis.
As P2P Clouds are increasingly being used for commercial purpose (such as in data center for banks31,32 or in
content delivery networks33,34 for telecom sector), it is useful to arrive at the security requirements speciﬁcations
of a P2P Cloud system. Towards this end, threat modeling is imperative in that it involves identiﬁcation of threats,
providing mitigation measures for the threats and creation of threat model to assist in further penetration testing30.
Apart from this, threat modeling also enables identiﬁcation of the circumstances to which a system should adapt.
Towards performing threat modeling for a P2PCloud system (see section 4), most of the semantics of the NFRmodel
used, has been retained in this paper. The notations used in creating the SIG for P2PCloud system are summarized
below:
The light bordered clouds are the softgoals, whether system softgoals or attacker’s softgoals. Attacker’s softgoals
may also be referred as the negative softgoals. Clouds with thick dark borders are the operationalizing softgoals which
can be decomposed into more speciﬁc security mechanisms. Softgoals have been decomposed by AND (single arc)
or OR (double arc) decomposition. Such decompositions are made by type or topic. Here type refers to the speciﬁc
descriptor in use (e.g. security, performance) and topic refers to the context in which such descriptor is used (e.g.
account, node).
Contributions of one softgoals to its parent softgoals are denoted by Make (green line with ++ label), Help (green
line with + label), Break (red line with –) and Hurt (red line with -). While Make indicates that an operationalization
(e.g. A solution) by itself can achieve (or satisﬁce) a goal,Help indicates that an operationalization can help but cannot
by itself achieve or satisﬁce a goal. Similarly, Break by itself can deny a goal while Hurt ‘hurts’ but does not by itself
deny a goal. The solid contribution line represents a contribution by a solution or a problem to a goal one is trying to
achieve or mitigate. In case the degree of positive or negative contribution of softgoals to their parent softgoals is not
known, one can use SomePlus (S+) or SomeMinus (S-) to indicate some degree of positive or negative contribution.
4. Threat Modeling for P2PCloud
The Goal-based Threat modeling for the P2PCloud using NFR model begins with the high-level security softgoal,
which is the Security of Online P2P Cloud System (P2PCS) also written as Security[Online Cloud System]. This is
then reﬁned to a more speciﬁc softgoal, namely Security[Node] which shows that to protect the Security of the Online
Cloud Network System, the Security of individual nodes must be ensured. Use of AND decomposition causes further
decomposition into softgoals: Conﬁdentiality/Privacy[Node] AND Integrity[Node] AND Availability[Node]. Node
integrity can again be satisﬁced to some extent by Node Authenticity OR by Node Non-repudiation.
The softgoal Availability of a node can be broken by DOS (Denial of Service) attacks. DOS attack as a negative
softgoal can be achieved by successive satisﬁcing of negative softgoals Bot installation in a node and Node Hijack
successively.
Spooﬁng the ID of a node can to some extent negatively affect the Authenticity or Non-repudiation of a node.
The negative softgoal ID spooﬁng can be satisﬁced to some extent by either launching DGA based attacks on node
addresses or Fast Fluxing the node addresses. Here DGA based attacks on nodes are referred to the much in use Domain
Name Generation Algorithm (DGA) based attack which makes ascertaining the identity of a rogue node difﬁcult35.
DGA attacks if made on host nodes ensure that such nodes now work under the control of Bots- their authenticity and
Non repudiation within a closed cloud network becomes questionable. Fast ﬂuxing refers to the rapid changing of IP
addresses of either the host nodes or of the host nodes and the domain name servers36.
Before arriving at the security requirements of the Cloud, the SIG formed so far can be analysed and threats can be
perceived keeping in mind the system goals. Some of the likely negative softgoals or threats for a P2PCS are identiﬁed
as:
a) Node Hijack Attacks
b) Denial of Service (DOS) attacks
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Table 2. Likely Threats and Corresponding Vulnerabilities in a Cloud Environment.
Sl. No. Threats Vulnerabilities Relation
1 Node Hijack Lack of policy for remote code execution
Lack of trust-based inter-peer
communication
Lack of monitoring and logging
Lack of reputation based trust management
Security aspect not considered in peer
reputation computation.
Threats 1, 2 and 5 are related. Botnet attack
results in a node hijack causing DoS attacks
to be launched from the attacked node.
2 Denial of Service (DOS) Unnecessary services enabled37
Uncontrolled downloading and use of
software37
Unprotected communication lines37
Threats 1, 2 and 5 are related. Botnet attack
results in a node hijack causing DoS attacks
to be launched from the attacked node.
3 Domain Generation Algorithm
(DGA) based attacks
Lack of policy for remote code execution
Inadequate network management (resilience
of routing)37
Lack of monitoring and logging
Threats 3, 4 and 5 are related. Botnet attack
result in generation of bogus domain names,
rapid change of IP addresses make tracking
of botnet command & control (C&C) server
difﬁcult.
4 Spooﬁng and Fast Fluxing Inadequate network management (resilience
of routing)37
Lack of trust-based inter-peer
communication
Lack of reputation based trust management
Security aspect not considered in peer
reputation computation
Threats 3, 4 and 5 are related. Botnet attack
result in generation of bogus domain names,
rapid change of IP addresses make tracking
of botnet command & control (C&C) server
difﬁcult.
5 Botnet Attacks Lack of policy for remote code execution
Lack of monitoring and logging
Lack of reputation based trust management
Security aspect not considered in peer
reputation computation
Threats 1, 2 and 5 are related. Botnet attack
results in a node hijack causing DoS attacks
to be launched from the attacked node.
c) Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) based attacks
d) Spooﬁng and Fast Flux attacks
e) Botnet Attacks
These are also some of the common attacks carried out in a cloud environment. Without going into any details of the
individual attack types (because of the space constraints), the associated vulnerabilities for each of these attacks are
now considered. This is an important part of threat modelling as threats come to exist only if vulnerabilities are not
plugged or mitigated. The threats with associated vulnerabilities and how they are related are as follows:
It is evident from the table above that the attacks and their associated vulnerabilities are inter-related. Due to the
interrelation of the threats, plugging some vulnerabilities can take care of more than a single threat.
From the SIG and the likely threats and vulnerabilities to the cloud network, a Threat-SIG can be formulated as a
means for Threat modeling. In the Threat-SIG, the threats form the negative softgoals and, operationalizing softgoals
Deny the satisﬁcing of the negative softgoals. The operationalizing softgoals are the mitigation measures and can be
arrived at by analyzing the threats and their corresponding vulnerabilities. Fig.1 shows the Threat-SIG for the Online
P2PCloud System with the operationalizing softgoals which are also the mitigation measures.
For instance, operationalizing softgoals of Extrusion detection and Reputation based Trust Management of a node
can to some extent Deny the negative softgoal DGA based attack. Periodic scan of installed program and Logging and
Monitoring can to some extent Deny the negative softgoal Bot installation.
A Cloud Privacy Policy for each node and a CloudMetadataManagement modelwill in turn contribute to satisﬁcing
Privacy or Conﬁdentiality of cloud nodes.
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Fig. 1. Threat-SIG for P2PCloud.
From the Threat-SIG, the mitigation measures that can be listed are:
a) Cloud Metadata Management Model
b) Privacy Policy
c) Trusted Download Policy
d) Logging and Monitoring of Cloud Nodes
e) Unnecessary services disabled across nodes
f) Periodic refresh of Routing Table rulesets
g) Reputation based Trust management
h) Trust based Policy for inter-peer communication
i) Periodic scan of installed programs in nodes
j) Remote Code execution Policy.
k) Extrusion Detection
l) Node Authentication and Authorization.
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5. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed a classiﬁcation of attacks on P2P networks which as per our knowledge has not yet
been attempted. Such re-classiﬁcation based on attacker’s goal has been a direct motivation towards performing a goal
based Threat modeling on P2P Cloud System or P2PCS, which is the other contribution of this paper.
Finally, due to identiﬁcation of the threats from the model and linking them to their respective vulnerabilities,
we have been able to analyse the threat-vulnerability pairs and identify the possible, applicable mitigation measures.
These measures are the operational goals in the Threat-SIG. Therefore, the third contribution of the paper and a direct
consequence of the goal-based Threat Modeling is, analysis of threat-vulnerability pair and identiﬁcation of mitigation
measures for them. For example a bot installation can Deny the positive softgoal Availability by launchingDoS attacks
and absence of remote code execution policy in a P2PCloud is a vulnerability which can be exploited by this threat.
Having a Remote code execution policy or Periodic scan of installed program can counter the threat bot installation.
Of course, threat-vulnerabilities, their effect on a P2PCloud system and the mitigation measures can be identiﬁed and
veriﬁed by experimental data also.
Towards securing the P2PCloudmodel, the security issues (which can be considered as open research areas) outlined
below, need to be considered. These have been derived from the operational goals. Such as, Logging and Monitoring
of nodes indicate that some kind of forensic process model speciﬁc to the needs of the Cloud environment should be
there.
• A reputation model based on the trust framework within which a peer system may operate can provide insight
into the security aspect of peer nodes. This in turn will introduce some intelligence in the way peers communicate
and introduce new peers.
• A forensic process model incorporating the basics of the traditional forensic model and, its applicability to cloud
environment is essential. In this context, existing proposedmodels may be reviewed and supplemented with other
services.
• A Cloud Metadata Management Framework would be much needed keeping in mind the growing concern about
present scenario where metadata of cloud transactions are not secure and its authenticity questionable due to lack
of proper management of such data.
• Policy-based research for minimal Privacy policies that all cloud providers need to have is also an area of much
concern.
• Clouds being popular and having little or no standards dedicated towards secure cloud operations has become a
focal point for a growing number of botnet activities. Testbed requirements for simulating secure transactions and
countering bot attacks on clouds need to be developed.
The research directions are in keeping with the trend of moving on to cloud data centers and in consideration of the
US Government Cloud Computing Technology Roadmap Volume I Release 1.0 drafted as NIST SP 500-29338.
With penetration of ICT infrastructure in every critical sector, lack of inbuilt security to prevent inﬁltration of
malware into critical information systems, critical sectors remain vulnerable to internal and external threats. The
paradigm shift towards superpeer39 computing and gradual adoption of cloud based data centers, creates research
needs to focus not just on destroying botnets but on securing cloud based superpeer structures and interactions.
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